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Unlawful Linking: First Amendment Doctrinal 




Recent cases, legislative bills, and enacted laws have made 
determining what First Amendment protection exists for 
hyperlinking an important issue.1  In Universal City Studios v. 
Reimerdes, the website 2600.com was enjoined from providing 
hyperlinks to websites that post computer code capable of 
cracking Content Scramble System (CSS), the encryption 
system which prevents DVD disks from being copied.2  The 
“Methamphetamine Anti-Proliferation Act of 1999” would have 
banned hyperlinks to websites which contain instructions on 
how to produce methamphetamine.3  Also, 18 USC § 842, 
 
        *  J.D. candidate, University of Minnesota, 2002. B.S. Biochemistry, 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1996.  M.S. Biotechnology, Northwestern 
University, 1998.  The author wishes to thank the staff and editors of MIPR 
for their assistance in writing and editing this article. 
 1. Hyperlinks are elements of Web documents that allow users to move 
from one document to other referenced documents.  As opposed to typing in a 
URL (Universal Resource Locator) address to cause the Web browser to 
download another document, hyperlinks allow easy access to other documents 
through a single mouse click.  The hyperlinks may point to another place on 
the same Web page, another Web page on the same Web site, or most 
frequently to a different Web site entirely.  Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, 
Recent Linking Issues, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 8, 2000, at 3.  The idea for hyperlinks 
was developed at the European Laboratory for Particle Physics (CERN) in 
Geneva.  KLAUS W. GREWLICH, GOVERNANCE IN ‘CYBERSPACE’ ACCESS AND 
PUBLIC INTEREST IN GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS 39 (1999). 
 2. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d. 346, 347 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 3. Criminal Prohibition on Distribution of Certain Information Relating 
to the Manufacture of Controlled Substances, H.R. 2987, 106th Cong. (1999), § 
5.  Section 5 would make it unlawful to 
teach or demonstrate to any person the manufacture of a controlled 
substance, or to distribute to any person, by any means, information 
pertaining to, in whole or in part, the manufacture or use of a 
controlled substance, knowing that such person intends to use the 
teaching, demonstration, or information for, or in furtherance of, an 
activity that constitutes a Federal crime. 
Id. at §5 (a).  The potential First Amendment implication of this proposed 
legislation was not lost on House Judiciary Committee members.  
Representative Bob Barr, R-Ga., said that the bill would “codif[y] in the 
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written in substantially the same language as the 
Methamphetamine Anti-Proliferation Act of 1999,4 bans inter 
alia hyperlinks to websites that contain information on making 
explosives.5  Finally, the “Digital Millenium Copyright Act” 
provides liability when an online service provider (“OSP”) 
provides links to an online location containing infringing 
material if certain safe harbor provisions are not met.6 
The ability to create a hyperlink from one website to 
another “can be seen as one of the Internet’s most 
distinguishing and valuable features.”7  Thus, hyperlinks are a 
key component to what has been termed “a perfect means for 
freely expressing one’s opinion.”8  As with the regulation of any 
type of expression, the regulation of hyperlinking is subject to 
 
criminal code for the first time a restriction on free speech in this country.”  
David Hess, Committee Markups and Votes, July 25, 2000, NATIONAL 
JOURNAL GROUP, INC., July 25, 2000.  Represenative Tammy Baldwin, D-Wis., 
said that the bill would “cast the net too widely and intrud[e] on First 
Amendment rights.”  Id.  Subsequently, a bipartisan amendment was adopted 
by a 15-12 vote to delete that provision of the bill.  See id.  As of September, 21 
2000, that bill was dropped entirely.  See 146 CONG. REC. H7990. 
 4. See infra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 5. See 18 USC § 842 (p).  Hyperlinks to sites that contain instructions on 
how to make explosives would be banned to the extent that they constitute 
teaching or demonstrating to a person with knowledge that such person 
intends to use the information for, or in furtherance of, a Federal crime.  See 
id. 
 6. See 17 USC § 512(d).  There is no liability if the service provider: 
(1) (A) does not have actual knowledge that the material or activity 
is infringing; 
(B) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or 
(C) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously 
to remove, or disable access to, the material; 
(2) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the 
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the 
right and ability to control such activity; and 
(3) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in 
subsection (c)(3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access 
to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject 
of infringing activity, except that, for purposes of this paragraph, 
the information described in subsection (c)(3)(A)(iii) shall be 
identification of the reference or link, to material or activity claimed 
to be infringing, that is to be removed or access to which is to be 
disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service 
provider to locate that reference or link. 
Id. 
 7. Raysman, supra note 1, at 3. 
 8. GREWLICH, supra note 1, at 267. 
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First Amendment limitations.9  However, the extent to which 
the First Amendment protects hyperlinking, and thus what 
standard of judicial scrutiny should be applied, is not yet clear. 
This Note critically discusses how the courts have thus far 
applied the First Amendment in determining the 
constitutionality of restrictions on hyperlinks.  Part I discusses 
the Internet as a new communications medium and describes 
current First Amendment doctrine.  Part II analyzes the 
appropriateness of classifying hyperlinks as expressive conduct 
for the purposes of First Amendment analysis. 
This Note proposes that the non-speech elements of 
hyperlinks are not significant enough to qualify as expressive 
conduct and therefore that the courts have erred in holding to 
the contrary.  Further, it is a serious error not to distinguish 
between software source code and hyperlinks.  Ultimately, the 
courts must be careful when deciding “just what the First 
Amendment should mean in cyberspace” so that they don’t “get 
it fundamentally wrong.”10 
 
I.   BACKGROUND 
 
A. THE INTERNET 
 
1. Development of a New Medium 
 
The Internet began life in 1969 as ARPANET, a project of 
the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA).11  This project 
was initiated as a solution to the perceived vulnerability of 
telecommunications networks in the event of armed conflict.12  
ARPANET was designed to enable computers operated by the 
military, defense contractors, and universities conducting 
 
 9. See Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 326 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that computer code, specifically HTML code which 
makes up most web pages and hyperlinks, is expression and therefore 
regulation of it is subject to First Amendment doctrine and analysis). 
 10. JEREMY HARRIS LIPSCHULTZ, FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF THE 
INTERNET 2 (2000) (quoting Supreme Justice David Souter who in 1997 said, 
“In my ignorance, I have to accept the possibility that if we had to decide today 
just what the First Amendment should mean in cyberspace, we would get it 
fundamentally wrong.”). 
 11. See Guy Basque, Introduction to the Internet, THE ELECTRONIC 
SUPERHIGHWAY THE SHAPE OF TECHNOLOGY AND LAW TO COME 7, 8 (Ejan 
Mackaay et al. eds., 1995). 
 12. See id. 
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defense-related research to communicate with one another 
through redundant channels even if some portions of the 
network were damaged during a war.13 
In 1984, the National Science Foundation (NSF) took over 
control of the ARPANET network with the goal of expanding it 
to include all university institutions and research 
organizations.14  In 1988, the NSF began to open network links 
to foreign countries, starting with Canada.15  In time, further 
opening of the network led to the structure in place today, a 
network of networks that transcends all national boundaries.16 
Today, access to the Internet is widespread.17  Individuals 
can obtain access to the Internet from many different sources.18  
“Most colleges and universities provide access for their 
students and faculty; many corporations provide their 
employees with access through an office network; many 
communities and local libraries provide free access”; access is 
also available commercially through a number of major access 
providers such as America Online, CompuServe, the Microsoft 
Network, and Prodigy.19 
 
2.   The World Wide Web & Hyperlinking 
 
The World Wide Web ("the Web") refers to an extensive 
amount of digital-information that is distributed among servers 
interconnected by the Internet.20 This stored information is 
largely in the form of hypertext documents (or "Web pages"), 
 
 13. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997). 
 14. See Basque, supra note 11, at 9. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See GREWLICH, supra note 1, at 38-39. 
 17. A GAO report issued in March of 1999 estimated that there were 153 
million Internet users worldwide.  See Securities Fraud On The Internet: 
Hearings Before The Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations Of The 
Committee On Governmental Affairs United States Senate, 106th Cong. 3 
(1999) (statement of Richard J. Hillman, Associate Director, Financial 
Institutions and Markets Issues General Government Division of GAO).  A 
Department of Commerce report issued in October 2000 found that 41.5% of 
US households had Internet access.  See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
FALLING THROUGH THE NET: TOWARD DIGITAL INCLUSION XV 1 (2000).  The 
same report found there were 116.5 million Americans online as of August 
2000.  See id. at 51. 
 18. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 850. 
 19. See id. 
 20. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21782, at 
*9 (D.D.C. 1999). 
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which are generally a combination of text and graphics but can 
also include audio and video content, programs, and other types 
of data.21 
Most hypertext documents contain annotated references, 
known as hyperlinks, to other Web pages.22  Hyperlinks can be 
thought of as “analogous to using a library’s card index to get 
reference to particular items, albeit faster and more 
efficiently.”23  Clicking on a hyperlink establishes a connection 
with the server of the linked site encouraging open, easy and 
seamless access from one Web site to another.24  Hyperlinks can 
be more than links between different sites; they can also be 
used as cross-references within a single document or between 
documents on the same site.25 
The Web is comparable, from the users’ viewpoint, to both 
a vast library and a sprawling mall.26  Uniquely, any person or 
organization with a computer connected to the Internet can 
publish information.27  “Web publishing is simple enough that 
thousands of individual users and small community 
organizations are using the Web to publish their own personal 
‘home pages’, the equivalent of individualized newsletters 
about the person or organization, which are available to 
everyone else on the Web.”28  Therefore, because of ease of use 
 
 21. See id. at 9-10. 
 22. See id. at 10. The court suggested that the expressive nature of 
hyperlinks, which are no longer confined to the medium of hypertext web 
pages.  Hyperlinks can now be inserted in word processing documents as well 
as e-mail messages.  See Microsoft Corporation, Turn Text into a Hyperlink in 
an Outlook 2000 HTML Message, <http://office.microsoft.com/assistance/ 
2000/olhtmlhyperlinks.aspx>.  If you find an interesting Web site, news group, 
file, or other information you want someone to see, you can insert a hyperlink 
to its location.  This saves you from typing a long description about the 
information or typing instructions to the e-mail recipient on how to get to the 
site.  Id. 
 23. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, 
at *6 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 
 24. See Raysman, supra note 1, at 3.  Hyperlinks in a web page, most 
commonly in the form of highlighted words and images, are imbedded with 
three pieces of information: the address of the “server,” the computer that 
stores documents, the document’s address on the server, and the protocol, 
which is the language another computer must use to retrieve the document.  
See John Markoff, A Free And Simple Computer Link, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 
1993, at D1. 
 25. See Microsoft, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21782, at *10. 
 26. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997). 
 27. See id. 
 28. Id. at 853 n.9. 
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and breadth of potential readership, the Web may be regarded 
as a perfect means for freely expressing one’s opinion.29 
 
3.   Different Types of Hyperlinks 
 
Since there are actually many different types of electronic 
links that come under the definition of “hyperlink,” it is 
necessary to specify what type will be referred to in this article.  
The most basic type of link used in web pages is a simple cross-
reference between documents on different sites.30  This is the 
type of hyperlink referred to in this article for analysis.  This 
distinction is critical because different sorts of issues may apply 
to different sorts of hyperlinks, frustrating a First Amendment 
analysis.31 
Beyond the most basic type of hyperlink, there is a linking 
technique known as framing.  Framing allows a browser 
window to be divided so that multiple Web pages can be shown 
simultaneously.  This technique is commonly used to provide 
an index to a web site along the border of the screen that 
remains in place while the user browses through the pages of a 
site.  However, this type of link has questionable uses such as 
displaying the informative content of one website while 
displaying the advertising content or identifying marks of 
another.32 
 
 29. See GREWLICH, supra note 1, at 267. 
 30. See Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 307 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).  “[T]he simplest link acts merely as an automated directory—
when the hypertext link is clicked with the mouse, the connection to the page 
with the link is dropped and the user’s computer then connects with the linked 
site, without further connection with the original page.”  INTERACTIVE SERV. 
SUBCOMM., ABA, WEB-LINKING AGREEMENTS: CONTRACTING STRATEGIES AND 
MODEL PROVISIONS 1-2 (1997). 
 31. See Brian D. Wassom, Note, Copyright Implications of 
“Unconventional Linking” on the World Wide Web: Framing, Deep Linking and 
Inlining, 49 CASE W. RES. 181, 186 (1998) (evaluating online copyright law as 
it applies to methods of integrating others’ information into Web pages such as 
framing, deep linking, and inlining).  Beyond copyright implications of linking, 
other potential grounds for liability have been suggested, including trademark 
infringement, trademark dilution, unfair competition, libel, and 
misappropriation.  See Mark Sableman, Link Law: The Emerging Law of 
Internet Hyperlinks, 4 COMM. L. & POL’Y 557, 561-66 (1999). 
 32. See Futuredontics, Inc. v. Applied Anagramics, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
2265, 3 (C.D. Cal. 1998).  In Futuredontics, the plaintiff operated a dental 
referral business and maintained a web site with web pages containing 
copyrightable subject matter.  See id.  The defendant maintained its own web 
site and using a frame displayed content from the plaintiff’s web site 
surrounded by the defendant’s logo and information.  See Id. 
2002] UNLAWFUL LINKING 117 
 
There is also a type of hyperlink known as deep linking.33  
In deep linking, a link is directed to a specific web page deep 
within another website.34 By clicking on a deep link the user is 
taken past the “front door” or home page of a website and taken 
directly to specific content bypassing the second site’s 
navigational structure.35 
Finally, there is a type of linking known as inlining.36  
Inlining refers to the use of graphic or text images in a website 
that are actually being taken from another website in a 
seamless manner.37  The only way the user would know that 
these images are “borrowed” would be to examine the code 
underlying the link.38 
 
4. Distinctions Between Posting Information and Linking To  
 Information 
 
It is important to note the distinctions between 
hyperlinking to content and posting content directly. A 
hyperlink can be thought of as an “annotated reference”, that 
describes to the web browser where information of a particular 
nature can be found.39  When a hyperlink is clicked on, the 
user’s web browser requests information from the referenced 
server, generally elsewhere on the Internet.40  Thus, the 
 
 33. See Ticketmaster, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, at *3. 
 34. See id. at 4.  By clicking on a link from the website of Tickets.com, a 
potential customer was transferred to an interior web page of Ticketmaster, 
thus bypassing the home page for Ticketmaster.  See id. at *3-4. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See Allison Roarty, Note, Link Liability: The Argument for Inline 
Links and Frames as Infringements of the Copyright Display Right, 68 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1011, 1017 (1999). 
 37. See id.  “The image or text that is linked to is then brought into and 
displayed on the linking Web page as though it is part of that Web page.”  Id. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 307 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).  Hypertext has been referred to as “an electrified table of 
contents” and “steroid-addled footnotes.”  STEVEN JOHNSON, INTERFACE 
CULTURE 133 (1997).  “[T]he hypertext link is in essence an automated version 
of a scholarly footnote or bibliographic reference: it tells the reader where to 
find the referenced material.”  Dan L. Burk, Proprietary Rights in Hypertext 
Linkages, 2 J. OF INFO., L. AND TECH., ¶ 9 (1998), <http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/ 
intprop/98_2burk/>. 
 40. “Links are generally interconnections to ‘elsewhere,’ and to other 
pages.”  Rob Shields, Hypertext Links: The Ethic of the Index and Its Space-
Time Effects, in THE WORLD WIDE WEB AND CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL 
THEORY 145, 150 (Andrew Herman & Thomas Swiss eds. 2000). 
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information downloaded generally does not come from the 
originating site of the hyperlink but rather comes from another 
server location on the Internet.41  This process can be 
analogized to asking a question and instead of actually getting 
an answer merely getting a suggestion of where to find the 
answer.42  Therefore, one website is actually providing the 
information and the other is simply pointing out the location of 
the providing website.43 
This distinction is important in the context of this article. 
While it may be a difficult Constitutional matter to decide 
whether or not certain expression can be posted on the 
Internet, it is a dramatically more difficult Constitutional 
undertaking to decide whether or not the location of this 
information can be described in the form of a hyperlink. 
 
B.   FIRST AMENDMENT RESTRICTIONS ON SPEECH REGULATION 
 
The essential idea of freedom of speech can be described in 
words attributed to Voltaire: “I disapprove of what you say, but 
I will defend to the death your right to say it.”44  This concept  
was considered to be so important by our Founding Fathers 
that it was incorporated into the Constitution through the First 
Amendment.45 
Yet, freedom of speech in our society is not absolute46 and 
 
 41. It is possible to have a hypertext link that connects to its own page but 
these circular links are not the type of hypertext link being discussed. 
 42. For example, if someone asked what the word "alacrity" meant it 
might be appropriate to refer him to the dictionary. 
 43. When a hypertext link is called or clicked upon, the browser takes the 
file name of the web page and translates this into machine code and thereby 
invokes other web page content.  See Shields, supra note 40, at 153. 
 44. S. G. TALLENTYRE, THE FRIENDS OF VOLTAIRE 199 (1907).  “The 
essence of that comment has been repeated time after time in our decisions 
invalidating attempts by the government to impose selective controls upon the 
dissemination of ideas.”  Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 63.  But see 
JACQUES BARZUN, FROM DAWN TO DECADENCE 361 (2000) (doubting that 
Voltaire ever actually wrote these words). 
 45. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The 
precise justification for why this sort of right is valuable is the subject of 
multiple lines of thought including: search for truth, individual autonomy, 
democracy and self-government, and tolerance.  See generally WOJCIECH 
SADURSKI, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ITS LIMITS 7-35 (1999). 
 46. The idea that there can be liability based on speech is an old one.  
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to insist that all types of speech be treated equally would be 
“both patently absurd and inimical to the freedom of really 
valuable speech.”47  Accordingly, the First Amendment does not 
protect some types of speech.48  Further, there are varying 
degrees of protection among the types that are protected.  The 
justification for allowing some suppression of speech is always 
based on harms avoided by such suppression49 and is never 
based upon dislike for the particular speech.  The Supreme 
Court has said that “the fact that society may find speech 
offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it.”50 
Consistent with the ideas above, judicial precedent has 
resulted in defined doctrinal categories of expression and 
accompanying tests for the application of judicial scrutiny.51  
Through the relevant test, the court seeks to balance the value 
of free speech with the potential harm of that particular type of 
speech.  Those doctrinal free speech categories most relevant 
when analyzing the regulation of hyperlinks, and thus 
reviewed here, include expressive conduct, prior restraint, 
advocating unlawful conduct, and content based versus non-
content based restrictions. 
 
1.   Expressive Conduct 
 
The seminal case for expressive conduct doctrine is United 
States v. O’Brien.52  In O’Brien, protestors of the Vietnam War 
were expressing themselves by burning their Selective Service 
registration certificates on the steps of the South Boston 
Courthouse.53  David O’Brien was then tried, convicted, and 
 
“Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases 
before the public . . . but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or 
illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity.”  4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 151-52 (1769). 
 47. SADURSKI, supra note 45, at 37. 
 48. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (providing that 
“[t]he First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance”). 
 49. See SADURSKI, supra note 45, at 38. 
 50. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) (Stevens, J., dictum).  
This idea has been shown by holdings in instances such as when the city of 
Skokie, Illinois, tried to stop the Nazi party from marching and the 7th Circuit 
held that the Nazis had a right to march.  See generally Collin v. Smith, 578 
F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). 
 51. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 
326 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 52. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 53. See id. at 369. 
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sentenced for knowing destruction of a Selective Service 
registration certificate under the Universal Military Training 
and Service Act of 1948.54  The Supreme Court held that “when 
‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same 
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental 
interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify 
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”55  In 
upholding the conviction of O’Brien, the Court elaborated a 
three part test for evaluating regulations limiting expressive 
conduct: the regulation must further an important or 
substantial governmental interest, the governmental interest is 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and the 
incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms must be no 
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.56 
More recently, this doctrine has been applied to evaluating 
the constitutionality of laws proscribing the burning of the 
United States flag.57  In United States v. Eichman, people were 
arrested for violation of the Flag Protection Act of 1989 after 
burning a United States flag on the steps of the United States 
Capitol.58  After the government conceded that the flag burning 
constituted expressive conduct,59 the Court held that the 
statute failed the three part O’Brien test because the restriction 
on speech was directly related to the message.60  Accordingly, 
the statute was subject to “the most exacting scrutiny” and 
found unconstitutional.61  The Court concluded by stating that 
“[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First 
Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the 
 
 54. See id. at 369-70.  As amended in 1965, the act provided that one “who 
forges, alters, knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner 
changes any such certificate” commits an offense.  See id. at 370 (italics 
omitted). 
 55. Id. at 376. 
 56. See id. at 377. 
 57. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990). 
 58. See id. at 312.  The Act provided in relevant part that “(a)(1) Whoever 
knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains on the floor 
or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United States shall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.”  18 U.S.C.A. § 700 
(2000). 
 59. See id. at 315. 
 60. See id. at 313-16.  “[T]he Government’s desire to preserve the flag as a 
symbol for certain national ideals is implicated ‘only when a person’s 
treatment of the flag communicates [a] message’ to others that is inconsistent 
with those ideals.”  Id. at 316 (citations omitted). 
 61. Id. at 318 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)). 
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expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea 
itself offensive or disagreeable.”62 
This doctrine has also been applied to evaluating the 
constitutionality of laws that regulate the distribution of 
computer source code.  In Junger v. Daley, the Sixth Circuit 
held that the O’Brien test was applicable for laws regulating 
the source code of an encryption program because source code 
has both functional and expressive features.63  In Junger, a 
professor challenged on Constitutional grounds the provisions 
of the Export Administration Regulations that regulate the 
export of encryption software.64  These regulations prevented 
him from publishing without a license encryption source code 
on his web site in support of his teaching activities.65  In 
analogizing computer source code to a musical score, the court 
held that although computer code is unintelligible to many and 
not traditional speech, it is an expressive means for the 
exchange of information and ideas about computer 
programming and therefore protected by the First 
Amendment.66  The court further held that “[t]he functional 
capabilities of source code, and particularly those of encryption 
source code, should be considered when analyzing the 
governmental interest in regulating the exchange of this form 
of speech.”67 
 
2.   Prior Restraint 
 
Concisely, the term prior restraint refers to 
“administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain 
communications when issued in advance of the time that such 
communication are to occur.”68  The prototypical forms of prior 
restraint are court injunctions stopping speech and required 
licensing of certain types of speech.69 
Near v. Minnesota was a classic example of the doctrine of 
 
 62. Id. at 319 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)). 
 63. See Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 484 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 64. See id. at 483-84. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. at 484-85. 
 67. Id. at 485. 
 68. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 773 (1997) (quoting Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 
2771 (1993)). 
 69. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 68, at 770. 
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prior restraint.70  In Near, a Minnesota law provided “for the 
abatement, as a public nuisance, of a malicious, scandalous and 
defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical.”71  Under 
the statute, a trial court enjoined a publication, known for 
criticizing public officials, from publishing or circulating “any 
publication . . . whatsoever containing malicious, scandalous 
and defamatory matter.”72  The Supreme Court held that the 
injunction was unconstitutional and that, “it has been 
generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief 
purpose of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon 
publication” and that there is a “deep-seated conviction that 
such restraints would violate constitutional right.”73 
 
3.   Advocating Unlawful Conduct 
 
The seminal case defining First Amendment protection of 
speech that advocates unlawful conduct is Brandenburg v. 
Ohio.74  In Brandenburg, a KKK leader was prosecuted 
pursuant to the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute75 for 
comments made during a rally that were captured on film by a 
news cameraman.76  The Supreme Court held that a restriction 
could be made on expression that advocates unlawful conduct 
without facing strict scrutiny provided that: imminent harm 
was threatened, there was a likelihood of the expression 
actually producing illegal action, and that there was an intent 
on the part of the speaker to cause imminent illegality.77  
However, the Court held that the abstract teaching of the 
moral propriety or moral necessity of force and violence was 
“not the same as preparing a group for violent action and 
steeling it to such action.”78  In this instance, the Ohio Criminal 
 
 70. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
 71. Id. at 701-02 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 72. Id. at 705 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 73. Id. at 713, 718, 723. 
 74. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 75. See id. at 445 (referencing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.13). 
 76. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445-46.  Relevant to inciting illegal 
conduct, the speaker stated that  “[w]e’re not a revengent organization, but if 
our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the 
white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to be some 
revengeance  taken.”  Id. at 446. 
 77. See id. at 447. 
 78. Id. at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 
(1961)). 
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Syndicalism Statute did not distinguish between mere 
advocacy and incitement to imminent lawless action and was 
therefore held unconstitutional.79 
In Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, the Fourth Circuit held that 
the First Amendment does not bar a publisher from being held 
civilly liable as an aider and abetter to an act of homocide.80  
Paladin Enterprises was the publisher of a book that served as 
an instructional manual for would-be contract killers.81  A man 
purchased the book and carefully followed its instructions 
subsequently murdering three people.82  Speaking to the First 
Amendment interests involved, the Fourth Circuit cited 
Brandenburg and acknowledged that paradoxically a right to 
advocate lawlessness is one of the greatest safeguards of 
liberty.83  The court held that, 
[e]ven in a society of laws, one of the most indispensable freedoms 
is that to express in the most impassioned terms the most 
passionate disagreement with the laws themselves, the institutions 
of, and created by, law, and the individual officials with whom the 
laws and institutions are entrusted.  Without the freedom to 
criticize that which constrains, there is no freedom at all.84 
However, the Fourth Circuit ultimately reversed the 
district court because regardless of the right to express 
disagreement with the laws, “it is equally well established that 
speech, which, in its effect, is tantamount to legitimately 
proscribable nonexpressive conduct may itself be legitimately 
proscribed, punished, or regulated incidentally to the 
constitutional enforcement of generally applicable statutes.”85  
In this case the court found that the conduct of the publisher 
was more than just abstract advocacy and reached the level of 
civil aiding and abetting of a contract murder.86 
 
 
 79. See id. at 448-49. 
 80. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 81. See id. at 241.  The book was entitled, Hit Man: A Technical Manual 
for Independent Contractors.  Id. at 239.  It contained 130 pages of detailed 
factual instructions on how to murder and to become a professional killer.  See 
id.  The book included advice so potentially dangerous that the court felt it 
necessary to omit portions of illustrative passages from its opinion in order to 
minimize the danger to the public from their repetition.  See id. at 239 n.1. 
 82. See id. at 239. 
 83. See id. at 243. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. 
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4.   Content Related Versus Non-Content Related Restrictions 
 
The distinction between content-based and content-neutral 
regulation of expression is critically important.  In Police 
Department of Chicago v. Mosley, the Supreme Court stated 
that “above all else, the First Amendment means that 
government has no power to restrict expression because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”87  
Accordingly, “[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively 
invalid.”88  Practically, this has resulted in the general rule that 
content-based restrictions on speech must meet strict scrutiny, 
while content-neutral regulations only need meet intermediate 
scrutiny.89 
However, an exception to this bright line was created in 
Young v. American Mini Theatres where it was established that 
regulations that are facially content-based are to be classified 
as content-neutral for purposes of judicial scrutiny if they are 
not aimed at the communicative effect of the speech, but rather 
at its secondary effects.90  In Young, the legitimate concern 
about the secondary effects on a neighborhood resulting from 
the presence of an adult theater was sufficient for the content 
based regulations to be considered content neutral when 
applying judicial scrutiny.91 
 
C.   RECENT RESTRICTIONS ON HYPERLINKING 
 
Recently, Congress has placed restrictions on hyperlinking.  
For example, although the Methamphetamine Anti-
Proliferation Act ultimately failed, legislation aimed at curbing 
dissemination of information about making bombs, worded in 
substantially the same manner92 as the methamphetamine 
 
 87. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
 88. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
 89. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. Fed. Communication Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 
642 (1994).  “Our precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to 
regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon 
speech because of its content.”  Id.  “In contrast, regulations that are unrelated 
to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny.”  Id. 
 90. See Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 84 (1976) (Powell, 
J., concurring); id. at 70-72 (Stevens, J., holding unclear). 
 91. See id. 
 92. The wording of the relevant provision of the Methamphetamine Anti-
Proliferation Act provided that it is unlawful  
to teach or demonstrate to any person the manufacture of a 
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legislation, was signed into law on September 8th, 1999.93 Thus 
hyperlinking to a website is banned to the extent that it 
constitutes distributing information pertaining to the 
manufacture or use of an explosive with knowledge that the 
information receiver will use the information to violate federal 
law. 
The courts have also recently placed restrictions on 
hyperlinking.  In Intellectual Reserve v. Utah Lighthouse 
Ministry,94 defendant was banned from providing links to web 
sites that posted copies of a copyrighted church handbook. 
Defendant was previously enjoined from posting the handbook 
online but sought to get around the effect of that injunction by 
stating on their web site that the handbook was still available 
and providing links to three web sites where the handbook 
could be viewed.95  The court found that the links amounted to 
contributory infringement and briefly dismissed any First 
Amendment concerns holding that “the First Amendment does 
not give defendants the right to infringe on legally recognized 
rights under the copyright law.”96 
Another recent case provided a First Amendment analysis, 
in more depth though not more satisfying. In Universal City 
Studios v. Reimerdes, the website 2600.com97 was inter alia 
 
controlled substance, or to distribute to any person, by any means, 
information pertaining to, in whole or in part, the manufacture or use 
of a controlled substance, knowing that such person intends to use 
the teaching, demonstration, or information for, or in furtherance of, 
an activity that constitutes a Federal crime. 
H.R. 2987, 106th Cong., Section 5 §421 (a) (2) (B) (1999).  Whereas, the 
relevant portion of 18 USC §842 provides that 
to teach or demonstrate to any person the making or use of an 
explosive, a destructive device, or a weapon of mass destruction, or to 
distribute to any person, by any means, information pertaining to, in 
whole or in part, the manufacture or use of an explosive, destructive 
device, or weapon of mass destruction, knowing that such person 
intends to use the teaching, demonstration, or information for, or in 
furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a Federal crime of 
violence. 
18 USC §842 (p) (2) (B). 
 93. See 145 CONG. REC. D953. 
 94. See Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 
F.Supp. 2d 1290, 1295 (D.Utah 1999). 
 95. See id. at 1294-95. 
 96. Id. at 1295. 
 97. The website 2600.com is run by Eric Corley, who is “viewed as a 
leader of the computer hacker community.”  Universal City Studios, Inc. v. 
Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d 294,308 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).  He and his company, 
2600 Enterprises, Inc., publish a magazine called 2600: The Hacker Quarterly.  
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enjoined from using hyperlinks to websites that posted 
DeCSS98, computer code capable of cracking the encryption 
system which prevents DVD disks from being copied.99  
Interming the hyperlinks “the practical equivalent of making 
DeCSS available on their own web site”100 the court held that 
since hyperlinks have both functional and expressive elements 
that the appropriate standard for First Amendment concerns 
was the O’Brien test.101 
Computer code is expressive.  To that extent, it is a matter 
of First Amendment concern.  But computer code is not purely 
expressive any more than the assassination of a political figure 
is purely a political statement. Code causes computers to 
perform desired functions.  Its expressive element no more 
immunizes its functional aspects from regulation than the 
expressive motives of an assassin immunize the assassin’s 
action.102 
The court went on to articulate that although “[l]inks bear 
a relationship to the information superhighway comparable to 
the relationship that roadway signs bear to roads,” links are 
different because they are more functional by taking one almost 
instantaneously to the desired destination upon the user 
clicking their mouse.103  Thus, the functionality with links, in 
the court’s view, is that they take the user to the destination 
“with the mere click of an electronic mouse.”104 
 
See id.  The Hacker Quarterly has included articles on such topics as how to 
steal an Internet domain name, access other people’s e-mail, intercept cellular 
phone calls, break into the computer systems at Costco stores and Federal 
Express, as well as a guide to the federal criminal justice system for readers 
charged with computer hacking.  See id. at 308-309. 
 98. CSS, or Content Scramble System, is an encryption system used by 
motion picture studios to control access to and prevent copying of their motion 
pictures stored on DVD discs.  See id. at 308.  CSS requires the use of 
appropriately configured hardware such as a DVD player or a computer DVD 
drive to decrypt, unscramble and play back motion pictures on DVDs.  See id.  
DeCSS is a software utility, or computer program, that enables users to break 
the CSS copy protection system and thereby view DVDs on unlicensed players 
and make digital copies of DVD movies.  See id.  DeCSS was created by a 
Norwegian national, Jon Johansen, in September 1999, after he discovered the 
CSS encryption algorithm and keys.  See id. at 311.  Mr. Johansen posted the 
executable code on his personal Internet web site and spread word of its 
availability.  See id. 
 99. See id. at 326. 
 100. Id. at 324. 
 101. See id. at 339. 
 102. See id. at 304. 
 103. Id. at 339. 
 104. Id. 
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In applying O’Brien, the court held that the DMCA served 
a substantial governmental interest, that the regulation was 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and that 
regulation “promotes a substantial government interest that 
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.”105  In 
deciding the third prong of the O’Brien test the court held that 
although it would be more direct to simply go after the posting 
sites themselves, that limiting a remedy to sites posting the 
material would achieve the government interest less effectively 
because of foreign sites that not subject to the DMCA and no 
subject to suit here.106  However, the Court qualified the scope 
of the injunction stating that, 
there may be no injunction against, nor liability for, linking 
to a site containing circumvention technology, the offering of 
which is unlawful under the DMCA, absent clear and 
convincing evidence that those responsible for the link (a) know 
at the relevant time that the offending material is on the 
linked-to site, (b) know that it is circumvention technology that 
may not lawfully be offered, and (c) create or maintain the link 
for the purpose of disseminating that technology.107 
So far, Reimerdes has been the only case in which the 
federal judiciary has analyzed, in detail, the First Amendment 
implications of regulating hyperlinks.  As such, the analysis in 
Reimerdes will be focused upon.  However, this issue is likely to 
come up again under the DMCA as well as other laws that inter 
alia regulate hyperlinks, depending on interpretation.  As such, 
First Amendment protection of hyperlinking is likely to be 
important in the future and therefore analysis of the 




A.   CONDUCT, FUNCTIONALITY, AND EXPRESSION 
 
To begin, one must understand that no speech is ever truly 
pure; it is always accompanied by conduct or non-speech 
elements that make the speech possible.108  The Ninth Circuit 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. at 340. 
 107. Id. at 341. 
 108. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 
284, 296 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
128 MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 3:111 
 
has recognized that at some level all speech is conduct because 
“speech in any language consists of the ‘expressive conduct’ of 
vibrating one’s vocal chords, moving one’s mouth and thereby 
making sounds, or of putting pen to paper, or hand to 
keyboard.”109  Accordingly, when looking for what qualifies 
something as properly categorized as expressive conduct for 
First Amendment analysis, we must look further than some 
simple element of conduct. 
Some conduct accompanying speech may be burdensome to 
others.  For example, talk may be noisy, or the distribution of 
leaflets may cause litter.110  When these burdensome “non-
speech” elements accompanying expression rise past a certain 
threshold level, the Court labels the activity expressive conduct 
and gives the expression a lower level of First Amendment 
protection.111  In some instances, we accept this because the 
harm in suppressing the non-speech elements and 
accompanying expression is less than the harm of letting the 
non-speech elements happen.112  Thus, sometimes suppressing 
the expression is the lesser of two evils. 
However, the practical reality is that away from extreme 
examples it becomes very difficult to draw a distinction 
between what is properly considered pure speech and what is 
properly considered expressive conduct.  The distinction has 
been termed both a “hazy line”113 and “too crude to identify 
those communicative acts which deserve special protection.”114  
 
 109. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 934 (9th Cir. 
1995) (en banc), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996), vacated on other grounds 
and remanded sub nom Arizonians for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 
1055 (1997), vacated and remanded, 118 F.3d 667 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 110. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 827 (2nd 
ed. 1988). 
 111. An extreme example given by the court in Reimerdes of expression 
rising to the level of proscribable conduct is the assassination of a political 
figure.  See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 
304 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).  At that level, the non-speech element has 
unquestionably gone far beyond the threshold necessary to apply a lesser 
standard of free speech protection, such as under the doctrine of expressive 
conduct.  See id. at 328 (by implication). 
 112. See SADURSKI, supra note 45, at 38.  The calculus is not quite as 
simple as saying that any net surplus of benefits justifies restriction.  One 
commentator has stated that the calculus would only be that simple in the 
case of a lenient scrutiny standard.  See id.  Whereas in the case of strict 
scrutiny, the social good resulting must be of great importance.  See id. at 38-
39. 
 113. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 55 (1982). 
 114. SADURSKI, supra note 45, at 44. 
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This is particularly true in the realm of the new communication 
medium known as cyberspace.  Commentators have noted that 
“there are signs of increasing difficulty in distinguishing speech 
from conduct on the Internet.”115  The inherent difficulty in 
drawing this line was evident in the court’s analysis in 
Reimerdes. 
 
B. EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT: AN INAPPROPRIATE DOCTRINE 
       FOR   HYPERLINKING 
 
1.   The Nature of Hyperlinks 
 
The court in Reimerdes fundamentally misunderstood the 
nature of hyperlinks.  In analogizing, the court found that 
hyperlinks are different than roadway signs because “they take 
one almost instantaneously to the desired destination with the 
mere click of an electronic mouse.”116  Strictly speaking, 
however, the court used the term “take” inappropriately.117  
Hyperlinks themselves do not actually “take” the user 
anywhere, not like a bus “takes” a rider to another 
destination.118  This wording by the court shows a 
misunderstanding of the nature of hyperlinks.  Hyperlinks 
merely provide an address to the user’s browser program.  Then 
if the user clicks on the hyperlink the user’s browser program 
requests information from the server at the particular 
address.119  While this point may seem to be a minor issue of 
semantics, it is critical to understanding the flaw in the court’s 
analysis.  To say that a hyperlink “takes” a user to a location, 
as the court did, is to expand the non-speech element of a 
hyperlink and thereby make the drawing of the hazy line even 
 
 115. Daniel A. Farber, Expressive Commerce in Cyberspace: Public Goods, 
Network Effects, and Free Speech, 16 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 789, 796 (2000) 
(discussing how conventional economic regulations may begin to pose First 
Amendment issues when applied to cyberspace activities such as economically 
valuable information transmissions termed expressive commodities). 
 116. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 339 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 117. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1201 (10th ed. 
1995) ("[T]ake", in this sense means to lead, “carry, or cause to go along to 
another place,” for example “this bus will [take] you into town.”). 
 118. See id. 
 119. After clicking on a hypertext link, “the user’s browser or other 
application can then retrieve the material from its location.”  See supra note 
40 and accompanying text. 
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more error prone.  Whereas, to say that a hyperlink merely 
provides a server address in a form the browser can understand 
keeps hyperlinks away from the line at which pure expression 
turns into expressive conduct. 
When properly understood, hyperlinks can be thought of as 
tantamount to electrified footnotes.120  The only difference is 
that hyperlinks make it somewhat easier for the reader to find 
and view the reference material.  It is unlikely that any court 
would find that the non-expressive, functional elements present 
in traditional footnotes would qualify them to be considered 
expressive conduct and thus analyzed under the O’Brien test.  
Therefore, it does not make sense to apply the O’Brien test to 
what are essentially footnotes in a modern medium of 
communication. 
 
2.   Hyperlinks Distinguished From Source Code 
 
Next, the court in Reimerdes improperly relied on the 
analysis of Junger v. Daley to bolster its position of hyperlinks 
being evaluated under the O’Brien standard.121  In one sense 
the court was right.  The logic of the Sixth Circuit could be 
applied to the DeCSS code itself.  Like the encryption source 
code of Junger, the DeCSS code communicated information and 
ideas about computer programming but also had a functional 
capability; it cracked the CSS encryption system in direct 
violation of the DMCA.122  However, where the court went 
wrong is that computer source code is distinguishable from 
hyperlinks and thus applying the same Junger source code 
analysis to hyperlinks is entirely inappropriate.  Computer 
source code is typically made up of a high-level computer 
language that is then compiled into machine-readable object 
code that the machine can execute to perform specific tasks.123  
The expressive nature of source code lies only in the ability of 
trained programmers to extract from the code ideas about its 
 
 120. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 121. See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 at 339.  Following the logic of 
Junger, the court found that links, like computer code in general, have both 
expressive and functional elements and “are within the area of First 
Amendment concern.” Id.  Therefore, the court found that the constitutionality 
of suppression of linking is determined by the same O’Brien standard applied 
to the DeCSS source code.  See id. 
 122. See id. at 303. 
 123. See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 116 (2000). 
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nature and function.124  Practically, though, source code is 
incomprehensible to the majority of people.125  Accordingly, 
source code’s value as a speech medium is limited. 
Conversely, the value of hyperlinks as a component of a 
new speech medium is great.  Hyperlinks are one of the most 
distinguishing and valuable features of the medium that has 
been deemed “a perfect means for freely expressing one’s 
opinion.”126  It becomes clear that there is a much greater free 
speech interest in hyperlinks than there is in source code and 
thus First Amendment reasoning developed for source code 
should not be glibly applied to hyperlinks.  Rather, a different 
analysis must be applied to hyperlinks in respect of its greater 
free speech stature. 
Moreover, there are deeply disturbing potential 
consequences of not recognizing the distinction between source 
code and hyperlinks.  Not distinguishing the two is recognizing 
the many different ways in which computer code is used in the 
digital age.  Specifically, there is a distinction to be drawn 
between functionality that is an important part of 
communication and functionality that merely exists along with 
communication.  Were it not so, the Junger logic could be 
applied to almost all modern communication media, weakening 
all First Amendment protection.  For example, documents 
created in word processors exist in computer memory as 
machine-readable coded data files.  These electronic documents 
contain a functional aspect in that they tell the computer what 
words to display when a wording-processing program loads a 
document file.  According to the analysis used by the court in 
Reimerdes, then, because word processing documents exist as 
computer code and have both functional and expressive 
features they would only be protected under the medium 
scrutiny O’Brien standard. 
Clearly, no rational person would argue that word 
processing documents are anything less than pure speech 
despite the fact that they exist as computer code in the memory 
of a computer and have functional elements.  The distinction 
between functionality that is an important part of 
communication and functionality that merely exists along with 
communication becomes clear in this context.  Hyperlinks, like 
 
 124. See id. at 106. 
 125. See id. 
 126. GREWLICH, supra note 1, at 267. 
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word processing documents, only have functionality for the 
sake of enabling communication.  So just as word processing 
document files should not be treated as expressive conduct 
merely because they have some functionality, hyperlinks 
should not be treated as expressive conduct merely because 
they have some functionality.  The Junger precedent should not 
be interpreted so that all computer code is treated the same.  
The Junger precedent should be limited to source code and not 
extended to hyperlinks. 
 
3.    A Thought Experiment 
 
 A thought experiment gives perspective to the difficulty of 
the court in recognizing hyperlinking as pure speech.  Suppose 
that the written word was unknown in our world and only oral 
communication was used.  Now imagine a new technology being 
developed which offers great potential for its ability to improve 
societal communication.  Suppose that this new technology is 
the written word and is rapidly adopted throughout society.  
Imagine the challenge in applying the doctrine of expressive 
conduct to the written word for the very first time.  The 
arguments that would be made both for and against mirror 
those made in the application of the doctrine of expressive 
conduct to hyperlinking. 
First, proponents of applying expressive conduct to writing 
would point out that unlike oral communication, writing 
involves the physical conduct of using a pencil and making 
marks on paper.  Second, they would say that a physical 
embodiment of communication, where none previously existed, 
is justifiably regulated at a different level than oral 
communication because it could cause negative effects 
previously unseen.  Specifically, written communication, unlike 
oral communication which is inherently limited to the earshot 
of the speaker, can take on a life of its own by being distributed 
far more widely than the speaker would themselves ever travel.  
For these reasons, some in our thought experiment would 
argue that expressive conduct is the appropriate doctrine for 
regulating the written word. 
Those against applying the doctrine of expressive conduct 
to the written word would point out that there is new conduct 
involved in writing but this conduct is merely in furtherance of 
communication.  Moreover, they would try to point out that 
from a free speech perspective, there is no difference between 
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oral and written communications, they both exist for the 
purpose of transmitting ideas. 
Stepping out of the thought experiment, it is important for 
the courts to realize that the question of whether to apply the 
doctrine of expressive conduct to hyperlinks is incredibly close 
to the situation presented in the thought experiment.  Today, it 
is beyond question that written and oral communications 
should be treated the same for free speech purposes.  This is 
understood by all because of the intimate familiarity that 
everyone has with the written word.  It is important to point 
out, though, that not everyone has this same degree of 
familiarity with communications on the Internet.  Some 
members of society, including some on the bench, only see 
negative aspects of the Internet as reported by the media 
including virus outbreaks and commercial fraud.  Therefore, it 
is difficult for some to appreciate the Internet’s role, and more 
specifically hyperlinks’ role, as the next biggest communication 
revolution since the written word. 
 
C. DIRECTIONS FOR THE COURT: WAITING FOR THE IDEAL TEST 
       CASE 
 
The Reimerdes case was not an ideal evaluation of the free 
speech nature of hyperlinking for two reasons.  First, it would 
seem that the defendants suspect status as “hackers” made the 
determination of the “hazy line” between speech and conduct 
even hazier.  Second, the copyright implications involved in this 
case made it a less than ideal fact set because the historical 
relationship between copyright and the First Amendment. 
Elements of the Reimerdes court’s opinion would seem to 
point towards picking a conclusion first and then finding 
reasons to support it.  Admittedly, the defendant’s own conduct 
is largely the reason for this.  In a move termed by the 
defendant as “electronic civil disobedience”, the defendant 
made an effort to link to as many websites offering the DeCSS 
code as possible.127  Understandably this would dispose the 
court to reaching a decision against them. 
Other aspects of the courts decision also suggest a 
predisposition against the defendant.  In an extreme 
comparison that may reveal its leanings the Reimerdes court 
 
 127. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 
303-304 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
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held that the expressive element of computer code “no more 
immunizes its functional aspects from regulation than the 
expressive motives of an assassin immunize the assassin’s 
action.”128  Also, the court pointed out that computer viruses are 
also computer code and held that “society must be able to 
regulate the use and dissemination of code in appropriate 
circumstances.”129  To this extent, the court held that the 
Constitution is not “a suicide pact.”130  Finally, in describing the 
defendant and his background, the court noted that the 
defendant publishes what is regarded as “a bible to the hacker 
community.”131  In describing the content of the defendant’s 
magazine the court held that “[n]ot surprisingly, 2600: The 
Hacker Quarterly has included articles on such topics as how to 
steal an Internet domain name, access other people’s e-mail, 
intercept cellular phone calls, and break into the computer 
systems at Costco stores and Federal Express.”132  Further, that 
“[o]ne issue contains a guide to the federal criminal justice 
system for readers charged with computer hacking.”133 
These points brought up by the court reveal its 
predisposition and contributed to the making of bad law.  A 
finding that hyperlinking is pure speech would simply not be 
equivalent to a “suicide pact”, as suggested by the court.  
Moreover, the inflammatory comparison by the court of 
hyperlinking to political assassination is unfair and displays 
prejudice.  Further, it is true that computer viruses are a 
menace and society should be able to regulate their use as the 
court suggests.  However, this is more of a reason to view 
different types of code differently rather than a reason to deny 
the pure speech nature of hyperlinking.  While the negative 
image that the court apparently had of the defendant is 
probably well deserved, it is unfortunate that it likely affected 
the calculus of the court’s decision. 
The second aspect of the Reimerdes case that makes it less 
than ideal as a model for determining the free speech nature of 
hyperlinking is that it involved copyright.  Where copyright 
infringement is concerned, the courts have historically 
 
 128. Id. at 304. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 308. 
 132. Id. at 308-309. 
 133. Id. at 309. 
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dismissed free speech arguments.134  To the extent that the 
Reimerdes court did not dismiss such arguments so quickly it 
should be applauded.  This has not been true in other cases 
such as the Utah Reserve case.135  Regardless, the ideal fact set 
for determining the free speech nature of hyperlinking would 
not involve copyright.  As this type of ideal case is bound to 
arise soon, a discussion of what options the court would have 
for analysis is appropriate. 
While the doctrine of expressive conduct is not properly 
applied to hyperlinks, this does not mean that only strict 
scrutiny will be applied to all regulation of hyperlinks.  As 
applicable to other types of pure speech, the court can use other 
judicial doctrines to balance the free speech interests of 
hyperlinking with the potential harm that may be caused.  For 
example, the doctrine of advocacy of illegal conduct might be 
applied to curtail some particularly egregious hyperlinking 
comparable to the situation discussed in Rice v. Paladin 
Enterprises.136  Alternately, some restrictions of hyperlinking 
may not be viewed as being content-based or might fall under 
the secondary effects exception.  In sum, arguing that 
hyperlinks should not be treated as expressive conduct is not 
taking an extremist First Amendment position because there 
are other doctrines under which judicial scrutiny might be 
lessened.  Rather, arguing that hyperlinks should not be 
treated as expressive conduct is simply realizing that 
hyperlinks are a new form of pure speech. 
 
III.   CONCLUSION 
 
The First Amendment doctrine of expressive conduct is not 
appropriately applied to hyperlinks.  The limited amount of 
functionality in hyperlinks exists for the sake of communication 
and not in addition to the communication.  Further, this 
 
 134. See e.g. Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 
75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1295 (D.Utah 1999) (“[T]he First Amendment does not 
give defendants the right to infringe on legally recognized rights under the 
copyright law.”).  “Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, few courts have upheld the argument 
that copyright law might be limited by the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.”  Stephen Fraser, The Conflict Between the First Amendment 
and Copyright Law and its Impact on the Internet, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 1, 1 (1998). 
 135. See Intellectual Reserve, supra note 134. 
 136. See supra Part I.B.3. 
136 MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 3:111 
 
limited functionality is not enough to cross the line into 
expressive conduct.  To hold otherwise, as the court in 
Reimerdes did, jeopardizes First Amendment protection for all 
communication that is enabled by modern technology.  
Ultimately, the courts must be careful when deciding “just 
what the First Amendment should mean in cyberspace” so that 




 137. LIPSCHULTZ, supra note 10, at 2. 
